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Risky products cause two types of costs for society; the accident costs and the
insurance costs. Liability rules allocate these costs between the parties involved. The
expansion in the scope of product liability over the past thirty years has increased
the cost of third-party liability insurance. However, the economic analysis of product
liability rules has, generally, focused on only the accident costs. Some recent works
have suggested that there is a strict trade-oﬀ involved when it comes to minimizing
the accident costs and the insurance costs. In this paper, we have extended the
economic analysis by considering both types of costs. An eﬃciency characterization
of product liability rules has been provided by assuming that consumers lack in the
knowledge about the risk. We have shown that even when consumers misperceive the
product risk, it possible to achieve eﬃciency with respect to the insurance costs as
well as the care levels.
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11. Introduction
Product liability has acquired immense importance over the last 50 years. Most of
the disputes involving product-caused injuries are governed by liability rules.1 Prod-
uct liability is said to be one of the fastest growing cost components that manufac-
turers and retailers are facing these days. The manufacturing of risky products leads
two associated costs for the society: the accident costs and the insurance costs. A
substantial expansion in the scope of product liability over the past thirty years has
increased the cost of the third-party liability insurance.2 Diﬀerent product liability
rules have diﬀerent implications for the magnitude as also the allocation of the acci-
dent costs and the insurance costs. Therefore, legal rules regarding product liability
have important implications for both the producers as well as the consumers of risky
products.
The implications of product liability rules have been widely studied in the fairly
extensive literature on the subject. Mckean (1970), Oi (1973), Goldberg (1974),
Hamada (1976), Spence (1977), Polinsky (1980), Marino (1988), Shavell (1987), Spul-
berg (1989), Boyd (1994), Miceli (1997), and Endres and L¨ udeke (1998) are some of
the many works that have studied various aspects of product liability. However,
the focus of these studies has been on the accident costs. Accident costs depend
on the care levels opted by producer ﬁrms as well the consumers. In addition, pro-
duction/consumption level of the good in question also aﬀects the accident costs.
Therefore, accident costs can be excessive either on account of suboptimal choice
of care levels or due to an ineﬃcient choice of production/consumption levels by the
parties. Focusing on only the accident costs, the above mentioned studies have shown
the following: When the product market is competitive and consumers are completely
informed about the product risk, product liability rules are irrelevant for eﬃciency -
the market relationship between consumers and ﬁrms ensures an eﬃcient outcome.
However, when consumers have incomplete information about the product risk, the
market mechanism cannot lead to an eﬃcient outcome. In that case, product liabil-
ity is required for economic eﬃciency. (See Spence (1977), Polinsky and Rogerson
(1983), Schwartz and Wilde (1985), Shavell (1987, pp. 52-53), Doughety and Rein-
1Geistfeld (2000), Harvey and Parry (2000).
2Until 1970s liability insurance was a small cost of doing business. See Viscusi (2006).
2ganun (1997), Endres and L¨ udeke (1998), and Sunding and Zilberman (1998)).
It is important to note that the need for product liability arises because of the in-
formational asymmetry that marks the product related accidents. While the producer
ﬁrms are supposed to be completely informed about the product risk, consumers, on
the contrary, are unlikely to know it correctly. This is so because consumers cannot
observe the care taken by the producer ﬁrm while producing the product. More-
over, even when consumers could be informed about the care taken by the ﬁrm, they
may still be incompletely informed about the risk. Because they may not know the
accident loss function (the value of the expected loss for the given care levels) cor-
rectly. The literature on product liability rules has concluded that when the care
is unilateral and consumers misperceive the accident-risk, the rule of strict liability
is eﬃcient. The rule of negligence, on the contrary, is said to be ineﬃcient. Under
this rule, consumers consume too much [too little] of the product when they under-
estimate [over-estimate] the risk. Polinsky (1980), Shavell (1987, ch 3, pp. 67-68) and
Geistfeld (2000) are some of the notable contributions that establish these claims. In
other words, it has been argued that, as far as the accident costs are concerned, eco-
nomic eﬃciency requires the producers to bear the entire accident costs.
However, the existing economic analyses of product liability rules suﬀer from a
major shortcoming. They have focused on only the eﬃciency in terms of the accident
costs, to a complete neglect of the insurance costs. As has been pointed out above, the
substantial expansion in the scope of liability over the past thirty years has increased
the cost of third party liability insurance for businesses. This is especially true for
countries like the United States of America, England, Australia and some parts of
Europe.3 In view of this development, while studying product liability rules it is
highly desirable to consider their implications in terms of the insurance costs along
with the accident costs. For instance, in certain empirical or theocratical context,
if it turns out that the ﬁrms are more eﬃcient risk bearers, then the other things
remaining the same a product liability rule will be eﬃcient if it requires ﬁrms rather
3Though the problem of the increased claims and the insurance costs is not a new one, it has
been a recurring issue in the US, England, Australia and elsewhere. In the US, for instance, liability
premiums have increased from 1.13 billion USD in 1968 to 19.1 billion USD in 1988. See Viscusi
(2006).
3than consumers to bear the residual accident loss.
However, Priest (1981, 87), Epstein (1985), Geistfeld (1992 2000), among others,
have argued that it is the consumers rather than the ﬁrms that are likely to be more
eﬃcient bearer of the product risk. The main argument is that the insurance costs are
likely to be lower for consumers as they can buy the ‘ﬁrst-party’4 insurance to cover
the risk; ﬁrms, on the other hand, have to buy the costlier ‘third party’ insurance.5
These ﬁndings have striking implications for the existing claims about the economic
eﬃciency (or the lack of it) of various product liability rules. More pointedly, these
ﬁndings imply that, ceteris paribus, a liability rule is eﬃcient if it requires consumers
rather than ﬁrms to bear the residual accident loss.
Therefore, if we expand the scope of economic analysis to incorporate insurance
costs, there appears to be a trade-oﬀ between the eﬃciency in terms of accident costs,
on one hand, and the eﬃcient risk-bearing on the other hand. The eﬃciency on the
ﬁrst count requires ﬁrms to bear the risk, while that on the second count may have
consumers as the residual risk-bearers. This trade-oﬀ becomes all the more strict if we
consider accident contexts that involve the bilateral care. To see why, note that when
insurance costs are lower for consumers, other things remaining the same, they should
bear the accident costs. However, in the context of bilateral-care accidents, it is well
known that when consumers are the residual bearers of accident loss, as under the rule
of negligence, the outcome cannot be eﬃcient. Some works have argued that the out-
come is ineﬃcient both in terms of care levels as well as the consumption/production
levels (for discussion see Shavell, 1987 ch. 3, also see Geistfeld, 2000). Therefore,
an implication of the existing claims regarding the accident costs and the insurance
costs is that a liability rule can achieve eﬃciency with respect to insurance costs only
by sacriﬁcing eﬃciency with respect to accident costs, and vice-versa. This paper,
in contrast, shows that suitably designed liability rules can resolve this trade-oﬀ to a
signiﬁcant extent.
4A ﬁrst party insurance covers the risk faced by the insuree himself. Third party insurance, in
contrast, is purchased to cover the risk that the insuree ( say a producer) may create for a third
party ( say a consumer).
5For arguments and more references see Priest (1981, 87), Epstein (1985), Geistfeld (2000).
4When we extend the framework of economic analysis of product liability rules to
include insurance costs, in principle, there can be several methodological approaches.
In this paper, we start the eﬃciency analysis by focusing ﬁrst only on the eﬃciency
with respect to accident costs. To this end, we provide a characterization of eﬃcient
product liability rules, by considering the two components of the accident costs - the
care levels and the production/consumption levels. Such eﬃciency characterization
is meaningful in its own right. Since, it enables us to delineate those features of prod-
uct liability rules that are crucial for eﬃciency (or the lack of it) in terms of accident
costs. More importantly, this exercise enables us to extend the eﬃciency analysis of
product liability rules to consider accident costs and insurance costs simultaneously.
This approach has turned out to be very helpful in the search of the possibility of con-
sistency or otherwise among various seemingly conﬂicting requirements of economic
eﬃciency. We explore the issue by making alternative assumptions about insurance
costs. In particular, we show that even when there are informational asymmetries
regarding the product risk, a suitably designed product liability rule can ensure the
eﬃcient care as well as the eﬃcient risk bearing.
There is another body of literature for which our results are relevant. In some
interesting works, the need for the tort liability of ﬁrms has been questioned. In
these contributions, it has been argued that the informational asymmetry in which
consumers lack the information about product risk might not be a problem that nec-
essarily requires that ﬁrms be made liable for accident losses. Since, ﬁrms might
signal the information regarding product related risk to consumers through price and
warrantees etc. (for references see Bagwell and Riordan, 1991). In response to these
contributions, many studies have argued that because of inadequate incentives (for
informing consumers about the risk) on the part of ﬁrms and limited capability of
consumers to process the information available, unregulated market cannot result in
optimum care by ﬁrms and optimum consumption by consumers. Also, in some con-
texts consumers may not prefer better information about the quality of the product
(Schlee, 1996).6 Leaving aside the issues of signaling mechanisms and the relative
6For arguments and discussion, besides afore-mentioned studies see Beales, Craswell and Salop
(1981), Priest (1991), Grossman (1981), Landes and Posner (1987, ch. 10), Viscusi (1991), Burrows
(1992), Schwartz (1995), Caves and Green (1996), Hamilton (1998), Arlen (2000), and Geistfeld
(2000), etc.
5merits of tort liability vis-a-vis other corrective mechanisms, we show that as long
as other mechanisms are imperfect in signaling the risk, there can be an eﬃciency-
enhancing role for tort liability. Moreover, we show that even when ﬁrms have no
liability in equilibrium, a suitable designed product liability rule can convey the in-
formation to consumers that is crucial for eﬃciency.
Finally, in view of our framework and results, we study the product liability rules
that are prevailing in India.
The analysis is carried out in a partial-equilibrium framework. The framework of
analysis, though very similar to the standard framework, is diﬀerent on at least the
following two counts. First, it is uniﬁed and more general than the standard frame-
work. No assumptions are imposed on the costs of care and expected loss functions,
apart from assuming the existence of a pair of care levels which minimizes the direct
costs of accident. Second, it provides a formal analysis of the entire class of product
liability rules in the context of bilateral care accidents where there is afore-mentioned
informational asymmetry. Here it should be noted that the existing formal analyses
have largely been undertaken only for the rule of negligence and the rule of strict
liability. In Shavell (1980, 89) the eﬃciency of the rule of strict liability with the
defense of the contributory negligence has been claimed without providing a formal
proof. As a corollary of our results, we formally show that the claim in Shavell (1980,
87) holds in a broader framework.
Section 2 introduces the framework of analysis that outlines the notations and
the assumptions made in the paper. Section 3 focuses on only the accident costs and
provides an eﬃciency characterization of eﬃcient product liability rules. In Section 4
we extend our analysis to consider the insurance costs. Section 5 undertakes economic
analysis of product liability rules in India. We conclude in Section 6 with remarks on
the nature of results in the paper.
2. The Social Optimization Problem
2.1 Notations and Assumptions: We consider accidents that involve two par-
ties, a consumer and the producer ﬁrm. Product-related accidents diﬀer from the ac-
6cidents generally considered under liability rules in that, in product-related accidents
injurers (ﬁrms) and victims (consumers) engage in a market exchange. Moreover, this
exchange is, supposedly, with the knowledge that the product might cause injuries to
the consumer later on. However, both the producer ﬁrm as well as the consumer can
take care to reduce the expected accident loss. The output of the ﬁrm and the amount
of purchase made by the consumer are treated as their respective activity levels. It
is assumed that in the event of an accident the entire loss falls on the consumer. We
denote by:
x the cost of care taken by the consumer, x ≥ 0,
y the cost of care taken by the ﬁrm, y ≥ 0,
X = {x | x is the cost of some feasible level of care for the consumer},
Y = {y | y is the cost of some feasible level of care for the ﬁrm },
π the probability of occurrence of an accident,
H the loss in case an accident actually materializes, H ≥ 0,
L the expected loss due to the accident. L is thus equal to πH,
Lc the expected accident loss as perceived by the consumer,7
n number of ﬁrms in the industry,
q number of units of the product produced by a ﬁrm,
ui(.) marginal consumption beneﬁt to the i0th consumer from the product,
p the market price of one unit of the product,
P(.) the inverse demand function for the industry,
C(.) the cost of production function for a ﬁrm,
DAC the direct accident costs - the sum of costs of care and the expected accident
loss, i.e., DAC = x + y + L(x,y) .
Analysis is undertaken in a simple competitive partial-equilibrium framework. We
assume:
(A1): Costs of care to be strictly increasing functions of care levels. As a result, the
cost of care for a party also represents the level of care for that party. Therefore, X is
the care choice set for the consumer, and Y is the care choice set for the ﬁrm. Also,
0 ∈ X and 0 ∈ Y .
(A2): π and H are functions of x and y; π = π(x,y), H = H(x,y).
7Lc is the product of the probability of accident and the accident loss in the event of accident as
are perceived by the consumer. See Assumption (A9).
7(A3): L is thus a function of x and y; L = L(x,y). Clearly, L ≥ 0.
(A4): L is a non-increasing function of care level of each party. That is, a larger
care by either party, given the care level of the other party, results in lesser or equal
expected accident loss. Decrease in L can take place due to decrease in π or H or
both.
(A5): X, Y , and L are such that DAC minimizing pair of care levels is unique and
it is denoted by (x∗,y∗), where x∗ > 0, and y∗ > 0. That is, the term x + y + L(x,y)
is uniquely minimized at (x∗,y∗). As a result, for all (x,y) 6= (x∗,y∗), we have
x + y + L(x,y) > x∗ + y∗ + L(x∗,y∗).
(A6): Both ﬁrms and consumers are rational and risk-neutral. Moreover, the ra-
tionality of each party is a common knowledge.The assumption regarding the risk-
neutrality of the party is relaxed in Section 4, wherein we consider insurance costs.
(A7): The legal due care standard (level) for the ﬁrm, wherever applicable (say un-
der the rule of negligence), is set at y∗. Similarly, the legal standard of care for the
consumer, wherever applicable (say under the rule of strict liability with defense), is
x∗. Also, y ≥ y∗ means that the ﬁrm is taking at least the due care. In that case it
will be called nonnegligent. y < y∗ would mean that it is taking less than the due
care, i.e., it is negligent. Likewise, for the consumer.
(A8): Marginal utility of the product is diminishing, i.e., u0
i(.) < 0.
(A9): Neither party observes the care taken by the other party. Firms are completely
informed about the expected loss function L(x,y). Consumers, on the other hand, are
not completely informed about the expected loss; when the expected loss is L(x,y), a
consumer perceives it to be Lc(x,y), where Lc(.) may not be equal to L(.). However,
Lc(x,y) ≥ 0 and satisﬁes (A4).
Note that (A1)-(A9) are standard assumptions in the economic analysis of liability
rules. Moreover, it should be noted that x, y, π, H, and L are deﬁned per unit of the
product.
2.2 Social Objective: For the ease of exposition, the product is assumed to
be homogeneous in all respects except the expected accident loss associated with the
product use. The product market is assumed to be competitive;8 there are n identical
8As is the case with our model, it is shown in Epple and Raviv (1978) and Geistfeld (2000) that
as long as DAC per unit of product are independent of the output level, the results obtained in a
8ﬁrms each producing an output of q units. As was noted above, the direct accident
costs per unit of product (DAC) are the sum of costs of care by the two parties
and the expected loss due to accident; DAC = x + y + L(x,y). Therefore, the direct
accident costs per ﬁrm are q[x+y+L(x,y)], and the direct accident costs for the entire
industry are nq[x + y + L(x,y)]. ui(.) denotes consumer i0s marginal consumption
beneﬁt from the product, and u0
i(.) < 0. P(.) is the inverse demand function for
the industry. It is assumed that the cost of production function, C(q), is such that
there is a unique positive output level at which a ﬁrm’s average costs of production,
C(q)/q, are minimized. This assumption is not necessary for our results to hold.9
In this setup, the social surplus is equal to the total beneﬁts from nq units of the
product that consumers derive (approximated by the area under the industry’s inverse
demand curve) minus total costs of production (the sum of costs of production and




P(z)dz − nC(q) − nq[x + y + L(x,y)]. (1)
The ﬁrst order conditions for q and n are given by (2) and (3), respectively.
P(nq) = C




+ x + y + L(x,y). (3)
Let ¯ q(x,y) and ¯ n(x,y) uniquely solve (2) and (3) simultaneously. In other words,
given x and y as levels of care taken by the consumer and the ﬁrm, when n = ¯ n, at ¯ q
marginal consumption beneﬁt is equal to marginal total cost of the product - marginal
cost of production plus DAC. That is, ¯ q is the optimal production level for the ﬁrm.
Similarly, when q = ¯ q, at ¯ n marginal consumption beneﬁt is equal to average total
cost of the product, i.e., ¯ n is the optimal number of the ﬁrm in the industry. Note
that ¯ q and ¯ n are functions of x and y.
competitive setting will hold more or less even when the market is not competitive. For the eﬀects
of market-power on the output and the choice of care by ﬁrms and the related issues see Beals,
Craswell and Salop (1981), Schwartz and Wild (1982), Polinsky and Rogerson (1983), Marino (1988
a, b), Spulber (1989, pp.408-410), Faulhaber and Boyd (1989), and Boyd (1994).
9However, if we take C(q) = cq, where c > 0, then equilibrium number of ﬁrms will be indeter-
minate.
9Remark 1: Since accident costs are linear in output, the socially optimum levels
of x and y are independent of the quantity of the product produced/consumed (see
eq. (1)-(3)). In other words, economic eﬃciency requires that the parties’ care levels
minimize DAC, regardless of the consumption level of the consumer and the produc-
tion level of the ﬁrm. Furthermore, (2) and (3) imply that C0(q) = C(q)/q. That is,
¯ q is the eﬃcient level of output for the form, irrespective of the choice of x and y.
Let ¯ q(x∗,y∗) = q∗ and ¯ n(x∗,y∗) = n∗. That is, when both the parties take eﬃ-
cient - DAC minimizing - care, q∗ and n∗, respectively, denote the optimal level of
production for a ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms in the industry.
2.3 Product Liability Rules: A Product Liability Rule (PLR) uniquely deter-
mines the proportions in which the consumer and the ﬁrm share the loss H, in the
event of an accident, as a function of the proportions of their (non)negligence. Let I
denote the closed unit interval [0,1]. Consider any X, Y , L, and (x∗,y∗). To capture
parties’ (non)negligence we deﬁne functions g : X 7→ I and h : Y 7→ I so that:
g(x) = x/x∗ if x < x∗, and g(x) = 1 otherwise; and
h(y) = y/y∗ if y < y∗, and h(y) = 1 otherwise.
In view of Assumption (A7), the legal standard for the ﬁrm, wherever applicable,
is set at y∗. Therefore, h(y) = 1 would mean that y ≥ y∗, i.e., the ﬁrm is taking
at least the due care and it would be called nonnegligent. h(y) < 1 would mean
that y < y∗, i.e., the ﬁrm is negligent. h(y) and 1 − h(y) will be its proportions of
nonnegligence and negligence, respectively. Similarly, for the consumer.
Formally, a PLR can be deﬁned as a function
f : [0,1]
2 7→ [0,1]
2,such that: f(g(x), h(y)) = (s, t), 10
where s ≥ 0 [ t ≥ 0] is the proportion of loss that the consumer [ the ﬁrm] is required
to bear. s + t = 1. From the deﬁnition of the function f it is clear that in principle
there can be inﬁnitely many PLRs.
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium: If an accident with a loss of H materializes,
the court will require the ﬁrm to bear t(x,y)H, in the form of liability payment
10This deﬁnition of a liability rule is quite general see Jain and Singh (2002), and Singh (2003).
10to be made to the consumer. t is determined by the PLR in force and is a func-
tion of x and y. The expected accident costs of a party are the sum of the cost
of care taken by it plus its expected liability. A ﬁrm’s expected accident costs,
therefore, are: y + t(x,y)π(x,y)H(x,y), i.e., y + t(x,y)L(x,y). As far as the con-
sumer is concerned, since he perceives the expected loss to be equal to Lc(x,y),
he will perceive the expected liability payment (made by the ﬁrm) to be equal to
t(x,y)Lc(x,y). Therefore, from a consumer’s perspective his expected accident costs
are: x + Lc(x,y) − t(x,y)Lc(x,y), i.e., x + s(x,y)Lc(x,y), as 1 − t = s.
The assumption of competitive market implies that p, the per unit market price
of the product, is given for both the parties and is equal to the total marginal cost
of production - marginal cost of production plus marginal expected liability of the
ﬁrm. When consumers misperceive the risk, demand for the product is a function
of the perceived full price. Given the relevant PLR and the level of care taken by
the ﬁrm, ‘perceived’ full price per unit of product is equal to the market price plus
the expected accident costs that the consumer expects to bear under the rule, i.e,
p + x + s(x,y)Lc(x,y). Therefore, a consumer i’s problem is to choose the quantity
qi and the level of care x to maximize his utility
Z qi
0
ui(z)dz − pqi − qi[x + s(x,y)Lc(x,y)] (4)
resulting in the ﬁrst order condition as
ui(qi) = p + x + s(x,y)Lc(x,y).
This means that given consumers’ misperception about L, consumers’ problem is
equivalent to that of choosing the quantity Q and the care x to maximize
Z Q
0
P(z)dz − pQ − Q[x + s(x,y)Lc(x,y)]. (5)
The ﬁrst order condition for Q is
P(Q) = p + x + s(x,y)Lc(x,y). (6)
Note that when consumers choose their demand for the product rationally, each con-
sumer’s marginal beneﬁt, ui(z), is equal to P(Q). Therefore, (5) is maximized w.r.t.
Q if ceteris-paribus each consumer chooses his demand for the product rationally. In
other words, other things remaining the same, rational choice by individual consumers
11would lead to the maximization of consumers’ surplus. In our analysis, however, this
maximization is constrained by the informational asymmetry.
Similarly, given the PLR and the care taken by the consumer, a ﬁrm’s problem is
to choose the quantity q and the level of care y so as to maximize its proﬁts
pq − C(q) − q[y + t(x,y)L(x,y)]. (7)
The ﬁrst order condition for q is
p = C
0(q) + y + t(x,y)L(x,y). (8)
Free entry assumption implies that proﬁt of each ﬁrm is zero, i.e.,
pq = C(q) + q[y + t(x,y)L(x,y)]. (9)
From (4)&(5) it is clear that the optimum level of care for the consumer is in-
dependent of his levels of consumption. In other words, a rational and risk-neutral
consumer chooses x that minimizes his expected accident costs, x + s(x,y)Lc(x,y),
regardless of his level of consumption. Analogous argument in view of (7)&(8) im-
plies that given x, the ﬁrm chooses y that minimizes its expected accident costs,
y + t(x,y)L(x,y).
An equilibrium is deﬁned as a tuple < ˆ Q, ˆ p, ˆ q, ˆ n, ˆ x, ˆ y > such that: ˆ Q = ˆ nˆ q; and ˆ Q,
ˆ p, and ˆ q satisfy (6), (8) and (9), respectively; and, ˆ x = arg minx∈X{x+s(x,y)Lc(x,y)}
and ˆ y = arg miny∈Y{y + t(x,y)L(x,y)}.
Now, from (6)&(8) in equilibrium we have
P(Q) = P(nq) = C
0(q) + x + y + s(x,y)Lc(x,y) + t(x,y)L(x,y) (10)
and from (6) and (9) we get
P(Q) = P(nq) =
C(q)
q
+ x + y + s(x,y)Lc(x,y) + t(x,y)L(x,y). (11)
123. Eﬃciency with respect to the accident costs
In this section, we restrict the analysis only to the accident costs. In other words,
we study the incentives that various product liability rules create for the parties for
the choice of the care levels and the production/consumption levels.
When consumers misperceive the risk, the actual output level per ﬁrm and the
number of ﬁrms in the industry are given by (10) and (11). However, for the given
levels of care opted by the consumers and the ﬁrms, the socially optimum level of
production per ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms in the industry are given by (2) and
(3), respectively. Generally the solution to (10)&(11) will be diﬀerent from that of
(2)&(3). (10)&(11), however, imply that C0(q) = C(q)/q, i.e., in equilibrium output
per ﬁrm is eﬃcient (Remark 1). But, from (10) and (11) it follows that even if we
assume that both the parties have opted for eﬃcient care levels, when consumers
misperceive the risk, i.e., when Lc 6= L the number of ﬁrms in the industry is not
necessarily eﬃcient. Therefore, even if we exclude the insurance costs and restrict our
attention only to the accident costs, a PLR may cause ineﬃciency on the following
two counts: (a) it may induce the parties to take ineﬃcient care, and (b) it may
induce ineﬃcient (total) production and hence consumption. In view of the above
discussion, it should be noted that the second kind of ineﬃciency can occur even
when that of the ﬁrst type is not there.
Remark 2: Let Lc 6= L. If under a PLR s = 0 or t = 1 in equilibrium, (10)&(11)
will exactly be the same as (2)&(3). Therefore, both the quantity produced by the
ﬁrms as well as the number of ﬁrms in the industry will be eﬃcient. This, however,
will not be the case when s 6= 0.
As regards to care levels, a rule is said to be eﬃcient iﬀ in equilibrium it induces
eﬃcient care by both the parties. To be eﬃcient on both the counts, the rule should
also induce eﬃcient output for the industry.
Deﬁnition 1: Eﬃcient Product Liability Rule
A PLR, f, is said to be eﬃcient with respect to the accident costs iﬀ, in equi-
librium it simultaneously induces the choice of the eﬃcient care levels by both the
parties, the eﬃcient output per ﬁrm and the eﬃcient number of ﬁrms in the industry.
13Formally, f is eﬃcient for given X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and C(q), iﬀ: (x∗,y∗) is a unique
Nash equilibrium ( N.E.);11 and in equilibrium q∗ and n∗ solve (10) and (11), simul-
taneously. A PLR, f, is deﬁned to be eﬃcient iﬀ it is eﬃcient for every possible
choice of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and C(q).
In the following, we provide a characterization of eﬃcient PLRs when there is in-
formational asymmetry vis-a-via the expected loss function, i.e., when Lc 6= L. That
is, we derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency of a PLR. Formally, we
show that when Lc 6= L, a PLR f is eﬃcient iﬀ f satisﬁes the condition of ‘negligent
consumer’s liability’ (NCL).
Deﬁnition 2: Condition of Negligent Consumer’s Liability (NCL):
A PLR, f, is said to satisfy the condition NCL iﬀ its structure is such that (i) whenever
the consumer is nonnegligent, i.e., whenever he has taken at least the due care, the
entire loss in the event of accident is borne by the ﬁrm, irrespective of the level of
care taken by the ﬁrm, and (ii) when the consumer is negligent and the ﬁrm is not,
the entire loss in the event of accident is borne by the consumer. Formally, a PLR f
satisﬁes condition NCL iﬀ:
(∀h ∈ [0,1])[f(1,h) = (0,1)] and (∀g ∈ [0,1))[f(g,1) = (1,0)].
Remark 3: A PLR may specify the due care standards for both the consumer and
the ﬁrm, or for only the consumer, or for only the ﬁrm, or for neither of the parties.
It should be noted that a PLR can satisfy the condition NCL only if it speciﬁes the
due care standards for the consumer; it may or may not set the due care standard
for the ﬁrm. When a PLR does not specify the due care standard for the consumer,
it cannot satisfy the condition NCL.
Theorem 1 A PLR is eﬃcient for every possible choice of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), Lc,
and C(q) only if it satisﬁes the condition NCL.
The theorem shows that the NCL is a necessary condition for a PLR to be eﬃcient
in terms of the care levels as well as the output levels. For a formal proof see the
Appendix. Note that under the condition NCL, a solely negligent party is liable for
11Throughout the paper whenever we refer to N.E., the strategy of a party will refer to the level
of care taken by this party. We consider only the pure strategy Nash equilibria.
14the entire accident loss. However, when both the parties are nonnegligent, it the ﬁrm
that is liable for the entire accident loss. Therefore a PLR can violate the condition
NCL by (a) making a solely negligent party bear only a fraction of the accident loss
and/or (b) by making the consumer liable for a fraction of the accident loss when
both the parties are nonnegligent. The proof of Theorem 1 shows that when (a) hold
then a negligent party will not fully internalize the consequences of its action, as a
result at least one party will take less than the eﬃcient care. On the other hand,
when (b) hold then the consumer will bear at least a fraction of the accident loss
even when he opts for the eﬃcient care level. This, in view of Remark 2, implies that
even if both parties take eﬃcient care, the production levels and consumptions levels
will be ineﬃcient.
As argued before, in order to satisfy the condition NCL, a PLR has to specify the
due care standards for (i) both the consumer as well as the ﬁrm, or (ii) for only the
consumer. Suppose a PLR belongs to subclass (i). In that case, the due levels of care
are part of the common knowledge. Recall that the due levels of care are assumed to
be set at levels that are appropriate for eﬃciency, i.e., at x∗ and y∗. Therefore, under
a PLR belonging to subclass (i), consumers - because of this common knowledge -
get to know of DAC minimizing pair, (x∗,y∗), from the legal rule itself.12 That is,
under PLRs in subclass (i), the expected loss function as perceived by a rational
consumer, Lc, may not be identical with L but will be such that (x∗,y∗) uniquely
solves min{x+y+Lc(x,y)}. Formally, in the case of PLRs that specify the due care
standards for both the parties, Lc is such that it satisﬁes the following property:
Property (P1): (∀(x,y) ∈ X × Y )[x∗ + y∗ + Lc(x∗,y∗) ≤ x + y + Lc(x,y),&
(x,y) 6= (x∗,y∗) ⇒ x∗ + y∗ + Lc(x∗,y∗) < x + y + Lc(x,y)]
Of course, when Lc = L, Lc satisﬁes (P1). Therefore, depending on the PLR in
question and consumers’ risk perception, Lc may or may not satisfy (P1). The next
theorem shows that the NCL is a suﬃcient condition for the eﬃciency of any PLR,
even when consumers misperceive the risk, i.e., even when Lc 6= L.
12As a matter-of-fact some rules, such as the rules of negligence with the defense, comparative
negligence, strict liability with the dual defense, specify the due care standard for both the parties.
15Theorem 2 A PLR is eﬃcient for every possible X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), Lc, and C(q),
iﬀ it satisﬁes the condition NCL.
Theorem 2 establishes that as far as the accident costs are concerned, PLRs that
satisfy the condition NCL are eﬃcient for every possible application, irrespective of
consumers’ misperception about the product risk. To put the argument informally, it
is shown that if a PLR satisﬁes the condition NCL then under it (x∗,y∗) is a unique
N.E. That is, the consumer and the ﬁrm will opt for the DAC minimizing care lev-
els, i.e., x∗ and y∗, respectively. Now, a choice of x∗ by the consumer implies that
s = 0 [t = 1]. In other words, in equilibrium the consumer will always opt for x∗,
and consequently will not bear any risk, making the risk-misperception irrelevant.
Also, when [t = 1] market price will fully reﬂect the product-risk (see (8)). On the
contrary, from Theorem 1, PLRs that violate the condition NCL cannot be eﬃcient
in all applications. One violation of the condition NCL implies that when x∗ is opted
by the consumer and y∗ is opted by the ﬁrm, s > 0 or t < 1, i.e., less than full lia-
bility of the ﬁrm and at least some risk-bearing by consumers. From (10)&(11) and
the proof of Theorem 1, this results in ineﬃciency. Therefore, as long as the market
mechanisms are imperfect in signalling the product-risk, i.e, as long as Lc 6= L, there
will be ineﬃciency in the absence of the residual liability of the ﬁrms, and product
liability rules can play an eﬃciency enhancing role.
The rule of the strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence holds
the consumer liable iﬀ he was negligent. Therefore the rule can be deﬁned as: (g =
1 → s = 0) and (g < 1 → s = 1). Clearly, the rule satisﬁes the condition NCL
and therefore is eﬃcient. Therefore, as an implication, Theorem 2 provides a formal
proof to the claim about the eﬃciency of the rule of strict liability with the defense
of contributory negligence by Shavell (1980, 87) in a broader context. Based upon
the fulﬁllment or otherwise of the condition NCL, we immediately get the following
corollary 1 from Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 The rule of strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence as
well as the rule of strict liability with the defense of dual contributory negligence,13
are eﬃcient (in terms of care levels, output per ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms in the
13the rule of strict liability with the defense of dual contributory negligence can be deﬁned as:
(g = 1 → s = 0) and (g < 1&h < 1 → s = 0) and (g < 1&h = 1 → s = 1).
16industry) for every X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), Lc and every C(q). On the other hand, the rules
of no liability, strict liability, negligence, negligence with the defense of contributory
negligence, and comparative negligence are not eﬃcient.
Remark 4: Both the rule of strict liability with the defense of contributory neg-
ligence as well as the rule of strict liability with the defense of dual contributory
negligence satisfy the condition NCL. However, it should be noted that the condition
is less restrictive than either of these rules. In particular, the condition does not
impose any restriction on liability assignment when both the parties are negligent.
Therefore, in principle it is possible to design more rules that satisfy the condition
and therefore are eﬃcient.
So far we have been focusing on the eﬃciency both in terms of care levels as also
the output/consumption levels. Next, we show that if we exclusively focus on the
the eﬃciency in terms of care levels, it is possible to derive a weaker condition for
eﬃciency of a PLR. As noted earlier, several rules set the due standards of care for
both the parties. If a PLR sets the due care standards for both the parties then for
any arbitrary Lc the following claim holds.
Theorem 3 A PLR, f, is DAC minimizing for every X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and Lc, if
it sets the due care standards for both the parties, and is such that
[g < 1 → [f(g,1) = (1,0)], & h < 1 → [f(1,h) = (0,1)]], & [f(1,1) = (1,0) or (0,1)].
Suppose a PLR is such that 1) it sets the due care standards for both the parties, 2)
it holds only one party (any of the two) to be fully liable when both the parties are
nonnegligent, and 3) when one party is negligent and the other is not then the solely
negligent party bears all the losses. Theorem 3 says that irrespective of consumers’
misperceptions of the product risk, such a PLR is eﬃcient as far as direct accident
costs are concerned. For proof see the Appendix. Note that under a PLR, as in the
statement of Theorem 3, Lc will satisfy the Property (P1). When f(1,1) = (0,1)
hold, i.e., when the ﬁrm is the residual loss bearer, the rule satisﬁes the condition
NCL and therefore is DAC minimizing. When f(1,1) = (1,0), i.e., even when the
consumer is the residual loss bearer, the proof shows that both the parties will take
eﬃcient care under the rule.
17It is pertinent to compare the claim of Theorem 3 with the existing claims in the
literature. In the context of bilateral-care accidents, it has been argued that under a
product liability rule if consumers are the residual bearers of accident loss, then the
rule will be ineﬃcient both in terms of the care level opted by the parties as well as
the output of the industry. (see Shavell, 1987 ch. 3, also Geistfeld, 2000). Theorem
3, in contrast, shows that even when consumers misperceive the product risk and are
the residual bearers of accident loss, a suitably designed PLR can ensure eﬃcient care
by providing the information that is crucial for economic eﬃciency.
It should be noted that each of the standard liability rules that set the due care
levels for both the parties satisﬁes the condition in the statement of Theorem 3. As
an implication of Theorem 3, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 2 The rule of strict liability with the defense of dual contributory negli-
gence, the rule of negligence with the defense of contributory negligence, and the rule
of comparative negligence induce the eﬃcient care levels from both the parties even in
the presence of informational asymmetry regarding the product risk.
4. Eﬃciency with respect to the accident costs as well as the insurance
costs
In this section, we extend the analysis to include the insurance costs. The analysis
has been undertaken by making alternative assumptions about the insurance costs,
namely when the insurance costs are lower for the ﬁrms and when these costs are
lower for the consumers. Since there are many aspects of insurance that imping on
the total insurance costs, whether the insurance costs are lower for the ﬁrms or for
the consumers is a matter of empirical analysis.
4.1 When the insurance costs are lower for the ﬁrms
For various reasons, the insurance costs can be less for the ﬁrms than those for the
consumers. It could simply be that the ﬁrms are risk-neutral, whereas the consumer
are risk-averse. In some instances even when both ﬁrms and consumers are risk-
averse, the administrative costs of insurance policies could be signiﬁcantly lower for
ﬁrms since a single policy bought by them can cover many accidents resulting from
18their products. The consumers on the other hand, will have to buy individual policies
and this, as some argue, results in large administrative costs.
When the insurance costs are lower for the ﬁrms, ceteris paribus, a PLR will be
eﬃcient if and only if under it ﬁrms rather than consumers bear the entire expected
accident loss. We already know from Theorem 2 that when both parties are risk-
neutral, a PLR is eﬃcient with respect to the accident costs, i.e., with respect to
the care levels and the productions/consumption levels, if and only if it satisﬁes the
condition NCL. Now suppose that the ﬁrms are risk-neutral and consumers are risk-
averse. Since, under condition NCL a consumer can avoid the risk altogether simply
by spending x∗ on care. Therefore, even a risk-averse consumer will not take excessive
care. A risk-averse consumer, however, has stronger incentive to take care equal to x∗
in order to avoid the risk of bearing accident loss. This implies that under condition
NCL, the entire residual expected accident loss is borne by the party with the least
insurance costs, i.e., the ﬁrm. Also, it is immediate to see that under condition NCL






the market price perfectly captures the expected accident loss leading to an optimal
level of consumption. Therefore, if the insurance costs are lower for the ﬁrms as they
are risk-neutral and consumers are risk-averse, a PLR is eﬃcient with respect to care
levels, the productions/consumption levels and the insurance costs, if and only if it
satisﬁes the condition NCL.
The same argument will hold when ﬁrms are risk-averse but can buy insurance at
a lower cost, provided that the policy designed by the insurer can avoid the problem
of moral hazards. We assume that the insurer is able to do so.14 Therefore, if the
insurance costs are less for ﬁrms than for consumers, a PLR is eﬃcient with respect to
the accident costs as well as the insurance costs, if and only if satisﬁes the condition
NCL. Formally,
Theorem 4 When the insurance costs are lower for the ﬁrms, for every possible
choice of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), Lc and C(q), a PLR is eﬃcient with respect to the
accident costs as well as the insurance costs, if and only if it satisﬁes the condition
NCL.
14Needless to say that this is a very strong assumption. See concluding remarks on this.
19The following corollary immediately follows from Theorem 4.
Corollary 3 When the insurance costs are lower for the ﬁrms, the rules of strict
liability with the defense of contributory negligence, and the rule strict liability with
the defense of dual contributory negligence, are eﬃcient in terms of care levels, out-
put/consumption levels as well as the insurance costs. On the other hand, the rule
of no liability, the rule of strict liability, the rule of negligence, the rule of negligence
with defense of contributory negligence, and the rule of comparative negligence are
not.
4.2 When insurance costs are lower for the consumers
As is argued in the introduction, Priest (1981, 87), Epstein (1985), Geistfeld (1992
2000), among others, have argued that consumers rather than ﬁrms could be the eﬃ-
cient bearer of the product risk. The main argument is that the risk-averse consumers
will buy the ‘ﬁrst-party’ insurance to cover product risk. Moreover, insurance against
the product risk can be a part of the general coverage purchased by consumers. Firms,
on the other hand, have to buy the costlier ‘third party’ insurance. Therefore, insur-
ance costs can be less for consumers than those for ﬁrms. In theory it could also be
the case when consumers are risk-neutral and ﬁrms are not.
When the insurance costs are less for the consumers, ceteris paribus, a PLR is
eﬃcient if and only if under it consumers bear the entire expected accident loss. As
an implication of Theorem 1, on the contrary, we know that that a PLR can be
eﬃcient with respect to the care levels as well as the productions/consumption levels,
only if it requires ﬁrms to bear the entire residual expected accident loss. Therefore,
when insurance costs are lower for the consumers, no PLR can be eﬃcient with
respect to care levels, the productions/consumption levels as well as insurance costs,
simultaneously.
The above analysis implies that when the consumers are eﬃcient risk-bearers, no
liability rule can be eﬃcient with respect to the accident costs and the insurance
costs. Note that this claim is true even if the availability of insurance does not cause
any moral hazards. However, there are PLRs that are eﬃcient with respect to care
levels as well as the insurance costs simultaneously, even when the insurance costs
are less for the consumers. Formally we have the following result:
20Theorem 5 When insurance costs are lower for consumers, for every possible choice
of X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), Lc, and C(q), a PLR, f, is eﬃcient with respect to the care levels
as well as the insurance costs, if it sets the due care levels for both the parties and is
such that,
(g ∈ [0,1])[f(g,1) = (1,0)], & h < 1 → [f(1,h) = (0,1)].
Theorem 5 says that when insurance costs are lower for the consumers, a PLR is
eﬃcient with respect to the care levels as well as the insurance costs, if it sets the
due care levels for both the parties and has the following structure: (i) whenever the
ﬁrm is nonnegligent, the entire loss in the event of accident is borne by the consumer,
irrespective of the level of care taken by the consumer, and (ii) when the ﬁrm is
negligent and the consumer is not, the entire accident loss is borne by the ﬁrm. To
see why, note that from Theorem 3, if a PLR sets the due care levels for both the
parties then
[(g ∈ [0,1])[f(g,1) = (1,0)] & (h ∈ [0,1))[f(1,h) = (0,1)]] ⇒ (x
∗,y
∗)is a unique N.E.
Since a ﬁrm can avoid liability simply by spending y∗ on care, it has strong
incentive do so if it is risk-averse. Again, if we assume away the issue of moral
hazards, the consumers will take eﬃcient care even when they buy the insurance. In
other words, if a PLR meets the requirements of Theorem 5, then it induces both
the parties to opt for socially optimal care levels. That is, it is eﬃcient with respect
to the care levels even in the presence of risk-aversion. Moreover, under the rule at
(x∗,y∗), the consumer bears the entire expected loss. Therefore, the rule achieves
eﬃciency on account of care levels as well as the insurance costs. The following
corollary immediately follows from Theorem 5.
Corollary 4 When the insurance costs are less for the ﬁrms, the rule of negligence
with the defense of contributory negligence as well as the rule of comparative negligence
are eﬃcient in terms of care levels as well as the insurance costs.
5. Product Liability Rules in India:
The governing product liability law in India is the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
The Act holds a producer of a risky product liable if the product suﬀers from a defect
21or deﬁciency. The deﬁnition of ‘defect’ is provided in Sec 2(1f) of the Act. Under
the Act, defect means any fault, imperfection or shortcoming in the quality, quantity,
potency, purity or standard which is required to be maintained under the law in force.
The ambit of the term ‘law in force’ is very broad. It includes not only the formal
law but also the implied law in the form of industry standards and norms.
The notion of ‘deﬁciency’ is made precise in the Sec 2(1 g) of the Act. It means
any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner
of performance which is required to be maintained by the law in force.15
A remedy is available to the consumer when a court/consumer forum is convinced
of there being a defect or deﬁciency in the product. The remedy includes an order
to remove the defect, replace the good with compensation, return the price, or pay
compensatory damages. In some rare instances courts have awarded punitive dam-
ages, especially when the defect is gross or when the seller/producer has resorted to
unfair trade practices.
Therefore, Indian product liability law is like the simple rule of negligence.16 As
our analysis shows, this rule is not eﬃcient. At best this rule can induce ﬁrms to take
eﬃcient care when the care is unilateral, i.e., when only ﬁrms can take care. It can-
not guarantee eﬃcient consumption. Notice that this rule does not specify due care
levels for both the parties. This means that when care is bilateral, Indian product
liability law cannot ensure eﬃcient care from both the parties. Moreover, the rule
can be eﬃcient with respect to the insurance costs only if consumers turn out to be
the eﬃcient risk bearers. However, in Indian scenario, where insurance market is at a
nascent stage, it is the ﬁrms rather than consumers that are likely to be the eﬃcient
risk bearers.
There is yet another problem with Indian product liability law. A very few cases
are actually litigated. Producers can escape liability in most of the instances of prod-
15The Act also has provisions against Unfair Trade practices. See Sec 2(1 r).
16In contrast, several versions of the rule of negligence, - e.g., rule of comparative negligence,
rule of negligence with the defense of contributory negligence - are applied in case of motor vehicle
accidents. See Singh (2004).
22uct caused injuries.17 Due to prolonged delays and legal uncertainty many people do
not sue the producers. Therefore, the law does not provide enough deference to the
producers.
6. Remarks on the results and issues in further research
We have analyzed the implications of diﬀerent product liability rules when con-
sumers do not have complete knowledge of product related risk. We have introduced a
condition named the condition of negligent consumer’s liability (NCL). When a prod-
uct liability rule satisﬁes the condition NCL, a consumer can ensure full compensation
in the event of accident merely by taking the due (eﬃcient) care. As far as accident
costs are concerned, the relevant result in the paper is Theorem 2. The theorem
shows that when consumers do not know the risk correctly, a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the eﬃciency of a product liability rule is to satisfy the condition NCL.
Moreover, we have extended the economic analysis of product liability rules by
incorporation insurance costs. We have studied the eﬃciency property of various
product liability rules by making alternative assumptions about the insurance costs.
Theorem 4 shows that if insurance costs are lower for ﬁrms then it is possible to
have liability rules that are eﬃcient with respect to the accident costs as well as the
insurance costs. However, if insurance costs are lower for consumers, then there is
a trade-oﬀ between the eﬃciency in terms of accident costs, on one hand, and that
with respect to the insurance costs, on the other hand. However, Theorem 5 shows
that even when consumers misperceive the product risk and have lower insurance
costs, it possible to achieve the eﬃciency with respect to the insurance costs and still
induce eﬃcient care by both the parties. Therefore, the trade-oﬀ can be resolved to a
signiﬁcant extent. An implication of the results in the paper is that in an empirical or
theoretical context if there are mechanisms that minimize ineﬃciency on account of
the over or the under-consumption, then it is possible to achieve eﬃciency on all three
fronts. Identiﬁcation of such mechanisms and contexts requires further research. But,
it is important to know that suitably constructed liability rules can, as we have shown,
supplement other signaling mechanisms by providing information that is crucial for
17Some estimates suggest that all liability related disputes constitute only 3-5 per cent of cases
lying pending before Indian courts. Moreover, most of liability suits concern motor vehicle accidents
(Singh, 2004).
23economic eﬃciency.
Finally, our extension of economic analysis to cover insurance costs should be
treated only as a one step in that direction. A more detailed analysis should consider
the issues of moral hazards that are created by the introduction of insurance.
APPENDIX
We prove Theorem 1 by way of establishing the following two Lemmas. Lemmas
1 and 2 show the implications violations of condition NCL.
Lemma 1 For a PLR, f, if [f(1,1) = (0,1)]& (∃h ∈ [0,1))[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)], then
there exist X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗) and Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A3), such that f is not DAC
minimizing.
Proof: Given f(1,1) = (0,1) and (∃h ∈ [0,1))[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)]. Suppose, f(1,h) =
(s1,t1)], where t1 ∈ [0,1). Let k > 0. As t1 < 1, t1k < k. Choose r > 0 such
that t1k < r < k. Now, consider the accident context characterized by the following
speciﬁcation of X, Y , L and Lc: X = {0,x0}, x0 > 0,
Y = {0,hy0,y0}, where y0 = r/(1 − h),
L(0,0) = ∆ + k + hy0 + x0 + δ, where ∆ ≥ 0, and δ > 0,
L(0,hy0) = ∆ + k + x0 + δ, L(0,y0) = ∆ + x0 + δ,
L(x0,0) = ∆ + hy0 + k, L(x0,hy0) = ∆ + k, and L(x0,y0) = ∆.
It is clear that (x0,y0) is a unique DAC minimizing conﬁguration. Let (x∗,y∗) =
(x0,y0). Take any Lc. Given x0 opted by the consumer, f(1,1) = (0,1) implies that
if the ﬁrm chooses y0 its expected accident costs are y0 + ∆. And, if it chooses hy0,
its expected costs are hy0 + t1(∆ + k). But, y0 − hy0 > t1k, i.e., y0 > hy0 + t1k.
Thus, y0 + ∆ > hy0 + t1(∆ + k), since t1 < 1. That is, given x0 opted by the
consumer, the ﬁrm is better-oﬀ choosing hy0 rather than y0 and, hence the uniquely
DAC minimizing conﬁguration, (x∗,y∗) = (x0,y0) is not a N.E. Therefore, there exist
X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A3), such that f is not DAC minimizing. •
Lemma 2 For a PLR, f, if (∃g ∈ [0,1)) [f(g,1) 6= (1,0)] holds, then there exist X,
Y , L, (x∗,y∗) and Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A3), such that f is not DAC minimizing.
Proof: Given (∃g ∈ [0,1))[f(g,1) 6= (1,0)]. Let, f(g,1) = (s1,t1) where s1 < 1. For
any k > 0, s1k < k. Choose r > 0 such that s1k < r < k. Now, consider the following
24X, Y and L: X = {0, gx0, x0}, where x0 = r/(1 − g),
Y = {0, y0}, y0 > 0,
L(0,0) = ∆ + gx0 + k + y0 + δ, where δ > 0, and ∆ ≥ 0,
L(gx0,0) = ∆ + k + y0 + δ, L(x0,0) = ∆ + y0 + δ,
L(0,y0) = ∆ + gx0 + k, L(gx0,y0) = ∆ + k, L(x0,y0) = ∆.
Again, (x0,y0) is a unique DAC minimizing conﬁguration. Let (x∗,y∗) = (x0,y0).
Now, let y0 be opted by the ﬁrm. When ∆ = 0, it is easy to see that for any Lc ≤ L
the consumer will be better-oﬀ choosing gx0 rather than x0. Next, consider the case
when ∆ > 0. Let, Lc = βL, where β > 0. If the consumer chooses x0 his ex-
pected accident costs are at least x0. And, if he chooses gx0, his expected costs are
gx0+s1β(∆+k). Now, whenever k/(∆+k) ≥ β > min{x0/(gx0+k), y0/(y0+δ)} it
is easy to see that gx0 +s1β(∆+k) ≤ gx0 +s1k. As gx0 +s1k < x0 by construction,
gx0 + s1β(∆ + k) < x0. Thus, (x∗,y∗) = (x0,y0) is not a N.E. Therefore, there exist
X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A3) such that f is not DAC minimizing. •
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose not. Suppose there exists a PLR, f, such that f
violates NCL and is eﬃcient for every X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), Lc, satisfying (A1)- (A3), and
every C(q). f violates NCL → (i) (∃h ∈ [0,1])[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)], or (ii) (∃g ∈ [0,1))
[f(g,1) 6= (1,0)].
Case 1: Suppose, (i), i.e., (∃h ∈ [0,1])[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)]holds. There are only two
mutually exclusive possibilities: f(1,1) = (0,1) or f(1,1) 6= (0,1).
Subcase 1: f(1,1) = (0,1): When f(1,1) = (0,1) is true, (∃h ∈ [0,1])[f(1,h) 6=
(0,1)] → (∃h ∈ [0,1))[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)]. But, when f(1,1) = (0,1) & (∃h ∈
[0,1))[f(1,h) 6= (0,1)], from Lemma 1, f cannot be DAC minimizing for all X,
Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and Lc. As a consequence, f cannot be eﬃcient for every X, Y , L,
(x∗,y∗), Lc, and C(q).
Subcase 2: f(1,1) 6= (0,1): Let f(1,1) = (s1,t1), where s1 > 0. Consider any X,
Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and Lc, such that (x∗,y∗) is uniquely DAC minimizing. In such con-
texts whenever there is no N.E., or when (x∗,y∗) is not a unique N.E., f is not DAC
minimizing and therefore not eﬃcient. When (x∗,y∗) is a unique N.E., though DAC
minimizing, f is not eﬃcient. As, in equilibrium s = s1 > 0, (9)&(10) will be dif-
ferent from (2)&(3). So, the outcome will not be eﬃcient in terms of total quantity
produced (Remark 2).
Case 2: Let (ii), i.e., (∃g ∈ [0,1)) [f(g,1) 6= (1,0)] hold. In this case also from Lemma
252, for some X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and Lc, f is not DAC minimizing.
Therefore, it cannot be the case that f violates condition NCL and is still eﬃcient
for every possible X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), Lc, and every C(q). •
Lemma 3 If a PLR satisﬁes the condition NCL then for every possible choice of X,
Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and Lc satisfying (P1), (x∗,y∗) is a N.E.
Proof: Let the PLR, f, satisfy the condition NCL. Take any arbitrary X, Y , L,
(x∗,y∗) and any Lc satisfying (P1). As f satisﬁes the condition NCL, f(1,1) = (0,1).
Let y = y∗ be opted by the ﬁrm. Then, for all x ≥ x∗, the expected accident costs of
the consumer are x + s[g(x),h(y∗)]Lc(x,y∗) = x, as when x ≥ x∗, s[g(x),h(y∗)] = 0
by condition NCL. So, if the consumer chooses x∗ his expected accident costs are
only x∗. Now, consider a choice of x0 6= x∗ by the consumer. First, consider the case
when x0 > x∗. In this case his expected accident costs clearly are x0, and he will be
strictly worse-oﬀ choosing x0 rather than x∗. Now, consider the case x0 < x∗. For x0 <
x∗, the expected accident costs of the consumer are x0 + s[g(x0),(y∗)]Lc(x0,y∗), i.e.,
x0+Lc(x0,y∗), as when x0 < x∗, s[g(x0),(y∗)] = 1 by condition NCL. But, the choice of
x0 can be better than that of x∗ for the consumer only if x0+Lc(x0,y∗) < x∗, i.e., only
if x0+y∗+Lc(x0,y∗) < x∗+y∗. This implies x0+y∗+Lc(x0,y∗) < x∗+y∗+Lc(x∗,y∗).
But, in view of (P1) this is a contradiction.
Thus, given that y∗ is opted by the ﬁrm, x∗ is a best response by the consumer.
Next, let x∗ be opted by the consumer. This, in view of condition NCL implies
that the expected costs of the ﬁrm are y +L(x∗,y). By assumption, x∗ +y +L(x∗,y)
and therefore y+L(x∗,y) is uniquely minimized at y∗. That is, given that x∗ is opted
by the consumer, y∗ is a best response by the ﬁrm.
Hence (x∗,y∗) is a N.E. •
Lemma 4 If a PLR satisﬁes condition NCL then for every possible choice of X, Y ,
L, (x∗,y∗), and Lc satisfying (P1),
(∀(¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ X × Y )[(¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → (¯ x, ¯ y) = (x∗,y∗)].
Proof: Let PLR f satisfy condition NCL. Take any arbitrary X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and
any Lc satisfying (P1). Suppose (¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ X ×Y is a N.E. (¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. implies that
if ¯ y is opted by the ﬁrm, expected accident costs of the consumer are minimum at ¯ x,
26i.e.,
(∀x ∈ X)[¯ x + s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x + s[g(x),h(¯ y)]Lc(x, ¯ y)] (12)
and if ¯ x is opted by the consumer, expected accident costs of the ﬁrm are minimum
at ¯ y, i.e.,
(∀y ∈ Y )[¯ y + t[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ y + t[g(¯ x),h(y)]L(¯ x,y)] (13)
Now, (12), in particular, → ¯ x + s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ + s[g(x∗),h(¯ y)]Lc(x∗, ¯ y),
i.e.,
¯ x + s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x
∗ (14)
as s[g(x∗),h(¯ y)] = 0 by condition NCL. And, (13)→
¯ y + t[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)]L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ y
∗ + t[g(¯ x),h(y
∗)]L(¯ x,y
∗) (15)
Adding (14) and (15)





Case 1: ¯ x ≥ x∗:
(∀h ∈ [0,1])[f(1,h) = (0,1)] by condition NCL. Thus, when ¯ x ≥ x∗, s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)] = 0,
t[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)] = 1, and t[g(¯ x),h(y∗)] = 1. Therefore, from (16), (¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. →
¯ x+ ¯ y +L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ +y∗ +L(¯ x,y∗). Now, ¯ x ≥ x∗ → L(¯ x,y∗) ≤ L(x∗,y∗). Therefore,
we get ¯ x+¯ y+L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗+y∗+L(x∗,y∗). But, ¯ x+¯ y+L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≥ x∗+y∗+L(x∗,y∗),
as (x∗,y∗) is DAC minimizing. This implies that (¯ x, ¯ y) can be a N.E. only if (¯ x, ¯ y) =
(x∗,y∗). Thus,
¯ x ≥ x
∗&(¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → (¯ x, ¯ y) = (x
∗,y
∗). (17)
Case 2: ¯ x < x∗:
Subcase 1: ¯ y ≥ y∗: As (∀g ∈ [0,1))[f(g,1) = (1,0) by condition NCL, in this
case s[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)] = 1, t[g(¯ x),h(¯ y)] = 0 and t[g(¯ x),h(y∗)] = 0. So, (16), reduces to
¯ x + ¯ y + Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ + y∗. Thus, ¯ x + ¯ y + Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ + y∗ + Lc(x∗,y∗), which is a
contradiction in view of (P1). Therefore,
if ¯ x < x
∗&¯ y ≥ y
∗, then (¯ x, ¯ y) cannot be a N.E. (18)
Subcase 2: ¯ y < y∗: Suppose f(g(¯ x),h(¯ y)) = (¯ s,¯ t). Let
t
∗ =
y∗ − ¯ y
(x∗ − ¯ x) + (y∗ − ¯ y)
and s
∗ =
x∗ − ¯ x
(x∗ − ¯ x) + (y∗ − ¯ y)
.
27There are two possible cases: (i) ¯ t ≥ t∗, or (ii) ¯ t < t∗. When (i) holds, from (15),
(¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → ¯ y + ¯ tL(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ y∗, since when ¯ x < x∗, t[g(¯ x),h(y∗)] = 0 by NCL.
That is, we get ¯ tL(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ y∗ − ¯ y, i.e.,
y∗ − ¯ y
(x∗ − ¯ x) + (y∗ − ¯ y)
L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ y
∗ − ¯ y, as ¯ t ≥ t
∗ → t
∗L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ ¯ tL(¯ x, ¯ y).
So, when (i) holds (¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → ¯ x + ¯ y + L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ + y∗, i.e.,
¯ x + ¯ y + L(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ + y∗ + L(x∗,y∗), which is a contradiction because (x∗,y∗).
When (ii) holds, i.e., when ¯ t < t∗, ¯ s + ¯ t = 1 = s∗ + t∗ implies ¯ s > s∗. When ¯ s > s∗,
from (14) (¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → ¯ sLc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ − ¯ x. s∗ < ¯ s → s∗Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ ¯ sLc(¯ x, ¯ y).
Thus, in this subcase (¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. implies s∗Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x∗ − ¯ x, i.e.,
x∗ − ¯ x
(x∗ − ¯ x) + (y∗ − ¯ y)
Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x
∗ − ¯ x, i.e., ¯ x + ¯ y + Lc(¯ x, ¯ y) ≤ x
∗ + y
∗,
a contradiction in view of (P1). Therefore,
if ¯ x < x
∗&¯ y < y
∗, then (¯ x, ¯ y) cannot be a N.E. (19)
Finally, (17) - (19) → [(¯ x, ¯ y) is a N.E. → (¯ x, ¯ y) = (x∗,y∗)]. •
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose a PLR, denoted by f, satisﬁes the condition NCL.
Given that f satisﬁes the condition NCL, there are two mutually exclusive possibil-
ities: (i) f speciﬁes the due care levels for both the parties, (ii) f speciﬁes the due
care level for only the consumer.
Case 1: Suppose (i) holds. In this case, as is argued before, the expected loss function
Lc will satisfy (P1). Now Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that for every X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗),
and Lc, (x∗,y∗) is a unique N.E., i.e., f is DAC minimizing.
Case 2: Suppose (ii) holds. In this case as the care level of the ﬁrm is irrelevant
from legal point of view, the liability assignment cannot be conditioned on its care
level; it will have to be conditioned only on the care level of the consumer. There-
fore, in this case the condition NCL would imply that the rule, f, be such that
(∀h ∈ [0,1])[g < 1 → f(g,h) = (1,0) & g = 1 → f(g,h) = (0,1)]. Under such a
liability assignment, (x∗,y∗) is a unique N.E. To see why, note that the consumer
will never opt for x > x∗, i.e., he will always choose a x such that x ≤ x∗. If
the consumer opts for x∗ his expected accident costs are simply x∗; on the other
hand, if he opts for some x < x∗ his expected accident costs will be x + Lc(x,y),
where y is the care level opted by the ﬁrm. Remember that from the liability rule
28itself, the consumer knows that x∗ along with some y minimizes DAC. Let y0 solve
miny{x∗ + y + Lc(x∗,y)}, i.e., according to the consumer (x∗,y0) minimizes DAC.
Therefore, (∀x < x∗)[x+y0+Lc(x,y0) > x∗+y0], i.e., x+Lc(x,y0) > x∗. It is immedi-
ate to see that for any x < x∗ opted by the victim, y = 0 is a uniquely best response
for the ﬁrm. Therefore, from the perspective of a rational consumer, under the PLR,
y opted by the ﬁrm is such that y ≤ y0. But, (∀y ≤ y0)[x + Lc(x,y) ≥ x + Lc(x,y0)],
i.e., x+Lc(x,y) > x∗. Thus, under f, opting for x∗ is a strictly dominant strategy for
the consumer. It is easy to see that given x∗ opted by the consumer, y∗ is a uniquely
best response for the ﬁrm. Again, (x∗,y∗) is a unique N.E.
Therefore, if a PLR, f, satisﬁes the condition NCL, then for every X, Y , L,
(x∗,y∗), and Lc, (x∗,y∗) is a unique N.E.
Now, (x∗,y∗) is a unique N.E. and condition NCL imply that in equilibrium s = 0
and t = 0. As a consequence, (10)&(11) will be identical with (2)&(3). This implies
that q∗ and n∗ will solve (10)&(11), simultaneously (Remark 2). Therefore, f is eﬃ-
cient for every X, Y , L, (x∗,y∗), and Lc. •
Proof of Theorem 3: Note that under a PLR, as in the statement of Theorem
3, Lc satisﬁes the Property (P1). When f(1,1) = (0,1) hold, i.e., when the ﬁrm
is the residual loss bearer of accident loss, the rule satisﬁes the condition NCL and
therefore, by Lemmas 2 and 3, is DAC minimizing.
Therefore, consider the case when f(1,1) = (1,0), i.e., when the consumer is the
residual loss bearer. Let x = x∗ be opted by the consumer. Then, f(1,1) = (1,0),
implies that for all y ≥ y∗, the expected accident costs of the ﬁrm are simply y. So,
the ﬁrm will not opt for any y0 > y∗. Now, consider a choice of y0 < y∗ by the ﬁrm.
For y0 < y∗, the expected accident costs of the ﬁrm are y0 +L(x∗,y0). But, the choice
of y0 can be better than that of y∗ for the ﬁrm only if y0 + L(x∗,y0) < y∗, i.e., only if
x∗+y0+L(x∗,y0) < x∗+y∗. This implies x∗+y0+L(x∗,y∗) < x∗+y∗+L(x∗,y∗). But,
in view of (A5) this is a contradiction. Thus, given that x∗ is opted by the consumer,
y∗ is a best response by the ﬁrm.
Next, let y∗ be opted by the ﬁrm. This, in view of p < 1 ⇒ f(p,1) = (1,0) and
f(1,1) = (1,0), implies that the expected costs of the consumer are x+Lc(x,y∗). By
Property (P1), x+y∗+Lc(x,y∗) and therefore x+Lc(x,y∗) is uniquely minimized at
x∗. That is, given that y∗ is opted by the ﬁrm, x∗ is a best response by the consumer.
Hence (x∗,y∗) is a N.E. Furthermore, arguing along the lines in the proof for
29Lemma 4, it can be shown that (x∗,y∗) is a unique N.E. •
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